Different military branches have enjoyed the prominence of being the arm of decision through history. In the bronze age, chariots ruled the battlefield. Later it was the spear wall, armored knights, the pike again, muskets, artillery, rifles, artillery again, armor, the airplane, and jets, each replacing earlier branches as technology unevenly improved their relative merits. For example, under Napoleon, massed artillery could break an enemy formation faster than infantry or cavalry could; whoever got the best use out of his artillery while holding reasonably firm everywhere else would win. By the Civil War, infantry weapons had increased in range to match artillery: what you could see, you could shoot. Artillery could fire over the horizon, but what good did that do anyone before forward observers could tell the cannon whether they were hitting anything? Infantry superceded artillery as the arm of decision for a while.
Typically, the arm of decision is employed against its enemy counterpart first, then turns to mop up whoever is left. Thus, in WWII, the Allied air forces focused on driving the enemy from the skies first. Only when control of the air was assured could ground support be used to proper effect. The Axis, preferring a faulty doctrine of chaining planes to ground support, naturally was driven from the skies. Thereafter, when the post-Normandy ground offensive ran up against stiff resistance, the Allied troops could call in a quick air attack and press on.
Following this principle of pursuing the enemy counterpart first, hard-core adherents of the new school propose an army of hackers aimed at gumming up the enemy's communication networks, and would strengthen the hacker corps even at the expense of the conventional forces' budget. Conservatives aren't ready to go that far; if the defense is stronger side in purely electronic warfare, the electronics corps won't be able to crack the enemy, and should be assigned immediately to supporting conventional forces. Both sides are plausible; it all depends on how effective electronic offensives can be.
The thing that most intrigues me about the debate, however, is not the capabilities (or incapabilities) of the new technology, but the subtext of the debate. If it were just about getting new hardware, there would be no conflict. Generals traditionally like getting new gadgets, and like the idea of getting them now. What they're having trouble with is the implications for hierarchical command structure.
To use the new weapons effectively, you need to use them quickly. Modern mobility makes military intelligence even less dependable than it has been in the past: wait a week, a day, sometimes even an hour, and it's obsolete. There won't be time to check all the way up the chain of command before information must be used in a decision. And, since the soldiers who can understand the data and analysis are typically not even officers, much less top brass, critical strategic decisions will be increasingly in the hands of ordinary enlistees.
Can the military handle that sort of decentralization? Can it win without it? Since the development of gunpowder, there's been a continual trend towards greater dispersal of forces, avoiding exposure to deadlier weapons. By and large, the junior officers, and then the NCOs, have handled the delegation of authority, and the responsibility for initiative, pretty well, particularly with the spread of universal education and citizen armies. They can probably handle it in the future, too, though how they can all be kept informed enough to make decisions with repercussions over vastly larger portions of the war is a sticky question. I think the risks inherent to the fog of war will increase, not decrease, with expanded detection and communication. Yes, battlefield information will be increasingly available, but the amount of information needed to make a good decision is increasing even faster. The chances for a catastrophic mistake are rising sharply. All the more reason to hope warfare, at least between great powers, is obsolete.